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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,
Company

Nature of the Case.

(hereinafter

Defendant Gibson Products

"Gibsons")

andf

specificallyf

the

manager of its West Valley store, defendant Chad Crosgrove,
(hereinafter

"Crosgrove")

accused

plaintiff

Mrs.

Shauna

Hodges, a part-time bookkeeper at the West Valley store, of
stealing

approximately

September

3,

accusations

1981
to

$580

(Ex.

the

from

3).

West

receipts

The

Valley

received

defendants
Police

made

Department

on
the
on

September 9, 1981 (Ex. 3), but failed to make a full and
fair disclosure of all the facts they knew concerning the
alleged crime.

(R. 611-22, 842-54; Ex. 3).

Mrs. Shauna

Hodges was arrested on a charge of theft (Ex. 4) and trial
was set for May 12, 1982.

During

the interim, Gibsons

suspended Mrs. Hodges from her employment.

(R. 863).

On March 18, 1982, Gibsons allowed Mr. Crosgrove to
resign

his

employment

when

he

admitted

stealing

and

embezzling from the West Valley store cash and goods worth
between $9,000 and $18,000.

(R. 588, 861). Gibsons failed

to inform the prosecuting attorney of Crosgrove1s thievery
until the eve of trial.
upon

learning

of

successfully moved
Hodges.

this

(R. 686-87; Ex. 15).
criminal

conduct,

the

Immediately
prosecutor

to dismiss all charges against Shauna

(R. 686-87; Exs. 6 & 15).

Shauna Hodges brought

this action

for malicious

prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against both defendants and for wrongful termination against
defendant Gibsons.

(R. 2-11).

Gibsons counterclaimed for

conversion of the money missing from the West Valley store's
receipts of September 3, 1981.

(R. 22-23).

The case was tried to a jury, the Honorable John A.
Rokich

presiding,

on

July

9-13,

1985.

The

jury

found

Gibsons and Crosgrove liable for malicious prosecution and
also found Gibsons liable for wrongful termination.

The

jury awarded Mrs. Hodges $70,000 in compensatory damages and
$7,000

in punitive

damages

from Gibsons

and

$10,000

in

compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages from
Crosgrove.

The jury also found that Mrs. Hodges was not

liable to Gibsons for conversion.
B.

(R. 464-66).

Statement of the Facts.

On September 17, 1981,

Shauna Hodges was arrested and charged with theft of $577, a
third

degree

felony, from

Gibsons

West

Valley

September 4, 1981. (R. 924-26; Ex. 4 & 5).
for May 12, 1982.

(R. 107)

store

on

Trial was set

In the interim, her chief

accuser, Crosgrove, the manager of the Gibsons West Valley
store

where

she

was

employed,

merchandise and cash worth over
Gibsons

kept

this information

admitted
$9,000.

to

stealing

(R. 589, 861).

from the Salt Lake County

Attorney who was prosecuting the action until the very eve

- 2-

of trial,

(R. 107). When the County Attorney learned that

"the chief witness against Mrs. Hodges had been fired for
embezzlement,"
dismissed.

he

successfully

moved

to

have

the

case

(R. 687; Exs. 6 & 15).

On September

4, 1981, the Thursday

before Labor

Day, Shauna Hodges was employed as a part-time bookkeeper at
the Gibsons West Valley store; (R. 903) Chad Crosgrove was
the manager of that store.

(R. 774-75).

During the day of

September 3f 1981, cash register number four, at the front
checkout, had been used.

(R. 785).

At the end of the

evening, following normal procedures, all of the money was
taken from each register, except for $100 which remains in
each register drawer for use the next day.

(R. 777-78).

The normal procedure was to take all of the "detail tapes",
cash (except for $100) and "voids" out of the registers and
put

them

in

a

separate

register's number.

cloth

(R. 777-81).

sack

marked

with

that

The "detail tapes" list a

complete record of what was "run" on the register for that
day.

(R. 780).

A "Z" tape, which is a total for each

register, was also run out of the machine and kept separate
from the register bags.
The

sacks

(R. 777, 780).

from all

of

the

registers

were

then

placed at the "service desk" at the front of the store (R.
782) and then all were placed in one large paper sack (R.
786-87).

The "Z" tapes were also placed loose in the same

- 3-

large paper sack.

(R. 786-77).

"Z" tapes sometimes were

"run" only from those registers which had been used during
the day, (R. 784) and sometimes were run also from registers
that were not used.

(R. 907-08).

The large paper sack

containing the money sacks and two tapes was then locked in
the safe for the evening.

(R. 793).

Crosgrove claimed that on the evening of September
3, 1981, he put the large paper sack containing all the
money

sacks and

the

"Z" tapes

in the safe.

(R. 793).

Crosgrove then left the store between 9:10 and 9:55 when all
the other employees had left the store.

(R. 793).

There is no written record kept of what registers
are used during the day.

The only way to determine if a

register had been used during the day is if there was a
money sack or a used "Z M tape in the large paper sack or to
ask some individual with personal knowledge.

(R. 783-88).

If the large paper sack did not contain a money sack or a
"Z" tape for a particular register, one would have to assume
that the register had not been used, unless one had personal
knowledge to the contrary.

(R. 785-86).

The next morning, Crosgrove opened the store alone
at

approximately

arrived.

8:30

a.m.,

before

any

employees

(R. 799-800). He also was alone when he opened the

safe shortly after opening the store.
after

other

9:00

a.m.,

Shauna

Hodges,

- 4-

(R. 829).

following

her

Sometime
normal

procedure, reported to work and obtained the paper sack from
Crosgrove.
sack
safe.

(R. 831).

containing
(R. 832).

the

Mr. Crosgrove took the large paper
individual

money

sacks

out

of

the

Carrying that sack, he escorted Shauna

Hodges to a room upstairs, known as the security room, where
she normally performed her duties.

(R. 911).

He left

Shauna Hodges with the sack and the money bags.

He never

verified to Mrs. Hodges what specific money bags were in the
paper sack.

(R. 244, 324).

The "security room" was not a

secure room, but merely an upstairs

room, (R. 905, 909)

access to which was restricted to the manager, Crosgrove,
the assistant manager and the two bookkeepers, including
Mrs. Hodges.

(R. 910-11).

Mrs. Hodges began to do her work as she always
did.

She laid out all of the money bags and tapes on a

table; she totalled all the checks, cash and other items for
each register and placed the figures on the daily report.
(R. 906, 911-12).

She compared the totals for each register

for which she had a money sack to the totals listed on the
"Z" tapes.

(R. 907, 911-12).

Some of the bags contained

more cash than was reported on the register tapes.

Although

Mrs. Hodges could have put this small change in her pocket
and no one would have been able to determine that it was
missing, she reported on the daily report that each of these
registers had excess money.

(R. 677; Ex. 8 ) .

- s-

Mrs. Hodges then completed the necessary forms for
the bank deposit.

When her work was accomplished and before

leaving the store, she gave the daily report along with the
bank deposit, including all money to be deposited, to Mr.
Crosgrove

at

approximately

1:00

p.m.

(R.

836, 912).

Although company policy required that the bank deposit be
made by 3:00 p.m. each day, Mr. Crosgrove, in violation of
that policy, delayed making

the bank deposit.

(R. 838,

1078-79).
Around 4:00 p.m. on September 4, 1981, Mr. Glen
Murray, the assistant store manager, who had worked during
the daytime hours on September 3, looked at the daily report
lying on Crosgrove's desk and saw that cash register number
four was not listed.
remembered
previous

that
day

attention.

(R. 839-40).

register

and

called

(R. 839-40).

number
the

Mr. Murray, apparently

four

matter

had

been

to Mr.

used

the

Crosgrove's

Mr. Crosgrove verified that the

register had been used and that the cash receipts were not
listed on the daily report.
At this point, according to Mr. Crosgrove1s version
of the facts, he either called Mrs. Hodges and then went to
the security room, or vice versa.

(R. 840-41).

Mrs. Hodges

came back to the store and Mr. Crosgrove then called the
corporate headquarters in Murray.

(R. 843).

Before Mrs.

Hodges returned, Mr. Crosgrove and Mr. Murray, the assistant

- 6-

manager, found part of the "Z" tape for register four in the
wastepaper basket in the security room,
his

storyf

Mr.

Crosgrove

claimed

he

(R. 847-48).
found

checks

In
he

identified as being from register number four in the deposit
bag while Mrs. Hodges was in the room, (R. 847-48) although
this involved a line by line examination of all the detail
tapes

from

each

register.

(R.

896).

He

also

gave

conflicting testimony that he could not identify the checks
as being from register

four until after Mr. Harris, the

corporate accountant, performed an audit.

(R. 849). Later

in the day, Mr. Crosgrove, with Mr. Murray and Mr. Harris
found additional tapes and slips from register four, plus
torn

deposit

slips

from

account in the garbage.

Mrs. Hodges' personal

checking

(R. 851, 854-55).

According to Mrs. Hodges, when she returned to the
store and while in the "security room," Mr. Crosgrove showed
Mrs. Hodges that register number four was not reported, that
the checks from register number four were included in the
deposit for register number six; and, also, he showed her
the other tapes and void slips he claimed to have found in
the garbage.

(R. 917-18).

Mr. Harris testified that he could only locate the
checks from register

four after a tedious review of the

deposit and all of the register tapes at the Murray store,
(R.

1052-53;

1057-59; 1095).

- 7-

Additionally,

Mr.

Harris

testified that the tapes in the garbage can were discovered
after he went to the West Valley store.
Certain

factsf

howeverf

(R. 1056-57).

remain

clear.

Mr.

Crosgrove, with or without other employees, checked Mrs.
Hodges1 work area.

Subsequent investigation by Mr. Harris,

the internal auditor of Gibsons, revealed that someone had
removed the checks and cash from register number four.

The

checks which had been in register number four, were placed
in register number two and a like amount of cash removed.
Neither the cash representing the face amount of the checks
taken in on register number four, nor the cash taken in on
register number four were ever found or recorded on any of
the reports.

(R. 1052, 1059).

Mrs. Hodges consistently

claimed that she never received the money sack for register
number four from Crosgrove.

(R. 912, 915; Ex. 8 ) .

After the Labor Day weekend on Tuesday, September
8th, Gibsons management

called

Mrs. Hodges

office and asked for an explanation.

to

Mrs. Hodges offered no

explanation since she had not committed the crime.
19).

the main

(R. 918-

At that meeting, Gibsons offered to allow Mrs. Hodges

to resign and let the matter drop if she would pay back the
the missing money.

(R. 920).

Mrs* Hodges, protesting her

innocence, refused to pay back the money since she had not
taken it.

(R. 920).

- 8-

The

next

day,

three

of

Gibsons1

officers

and

managers, at the direction of their superiors, at Gibsons,
went to the West Valley Police and reported the theft.

Each

of them testified that they went to the police in their
capacity as employees or managers of Gibsons.

(R. 596-611f

679-80, 859, 1074).
They spoke to Gene Lyday, a detective at the West
Valley Police Department.

Mr. Crosgrove

Hodges as the chief suspect.

identified Mrs.

(R. 615; Ex. 3).

The story

they told the detective was not a full and accurate story.
In fact, it was replete with misstatements and omissions.
Among other things, no one told Detective Lyday that at that
time Mr. Crosgrove had been stealing

regularly

from the

Gibsons West Valley store; (R. 1081) or that it was the
assistant
missing.

manager

who

discovered

(R. 842, 1080-82).

that

the

money

was

In fact, they told Detective

Lyday that it was Mr. Crosgrove who discovered the missing
money.

(R. 618-19).

They also told the detective that it

was Mr. Crosgrove who discovered the missing register tapes
torn up in the wastepaper basket in the security room.
621).

(R.

Based on this inaccurate and incomplete information,

Detective Lyday completed a sworn information and a probable
cause
Hodges.

statement

supporting

the

(R. 621-23; Ex. 3 & 5).

- 9-

charges

against

Mrs.

The

Salt

Lake

County

prosecutor

reviewed

the

information he was given by Detective Lyday and decided to
prosecute Mrs. Hodges for theft.

(R. 684; Ex. 5 & 14).

At the probable cause hearing, Crosgrove continued
to supply

false and misleading

information.

He did not

reveal that he was in the process of stealing money from
Gibsons; he swore that it was he who discovered that the
money was missing and he neglected to state that it was not
him, but his assistant manager Glenn Murray who discovered
the discrepancy on the daily report.

(R. 842).

Mrs. Hodges was bound over for trial, was taken out
in handcuffs and told to report to pretrial services at
least once a day.

(R. 927-29).

Trial was scheduled for May

11, 1982.
During that interval, Mrs. Hodges was undergoing
severe emotional distress.

Her family had been going to a

social worker for some time to deal with problems with her
son.

As soon as the arrest occurred, Mrs. Hodges began

seeing the clinical social worker for individual therapy for
the severe depression and severe emotional distress induced
by the trauma of having been accused of a crime.

(R. 935-

49) .
It

was

during

that

same

interval

when

Gibsons

discovered that Mr. Crosgrove the accuser of Mrs. Hodges,
had

stolen

between

$9,000

and

- 10 -

$18,000

in

cash

and

merchandise from the Gibsons West Valley Store.
861).

This

thievery

had been going on since prior

September 3-4, 1981.
merchandise
left.

from

(R. 599,
to

(R. 862). Mr. Crosgrove would remove

the

store

(R. 900-02).

after

all

the employees

had

Also, he would steal cash by some

complicated process whereby he delayed submitting the bank
deposits for the store for several days, similar to the way
he delayed
1981.

submitting

the

bank

deposit

on

September

4,

(R. 862). The Gibsons management discovered this by

an audit of their books and records and on March 18f 1982,
allowed Mr. Crosgrove to repay $9,000 of the money he had
stolen and resign.
management

never

(R. 599, 861; Ex. 19).

reported

the

theft

to

The Gibsons

the West

Valley

Police and made no attempt to prosecute Mr. Crosgrove.
601).

They allowed him to cut a deal, the same deal they

had offered to Mrs. Hodges.
Hodges

(R.

who

did

not

commit

(R. 601). However, unlike Mrs.
a

crime, Mr.

Crosgrove

had

committed the crime and took advantage of the deal rather
than face the criminal justice system.

(R. 861-62).

The Gibsons management never informed the Salt Lake
County prosecutor who was prosecuting the case against Mrs.
Hodges

that

Crosgrove, Mrs. Hodges' chief

accuser, was

stealing left and right from the West Valley store.
60).

As Mr. Harris explained:

(R.

He "only [did] what was

directed by the officers of the company" and "it was not

- 11 -

[his] responsibility" to inform the prosecutor or the police
about this exculpatory evidence.

(R. 1081-82).

However,

two days before trial, one of Gibsons1 management employees,
Mr. Birch, "communicated

to the county attorney

charges would be dropped."

(R. 644-46, 721-24).

that the
As soon as

the county prosecutor learned that his star witness had been
caught with his hands in the till, he moved to have the case
dismissed.

(R. 686, Ex. 15). As the prosecutor testified:

"According to the information, the only person [sic] who had
access to the money was Mr. Crosgrove and Mrs. Hodges . .
."

(R. 696). The day after the case was dismissed, Gibsons

fired Mrs. Hodges claiming that she had failed to follow
proper procedures.

(R. 953-54; Ex. 27).

Thereafter, Mrs. Hodges continued to suffer great
emotional

distress

manifesting

itself

in

various

ways,

including great tension at home and a significant weight
gain.

She continued to seek psychological therapy from the

clinical social worker.
employment.

Also, she attempted to obtain other

Despite the fact that she had a great deal of

experience, she was unable to obtain any employment as a
bookkeeper, or in any other capacity.

The false accusation

and the wrongful termination notice continued to haunt her,
as it still haunts her.

(R. 935-53).
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C.

Summary of Arguments.

1.

The evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that

defendants Gibsons and Crosgrove caused the institution of
criminal proceedings against plaintiff Shauna Hodges who was
not guilty

of the offense charged and that they did so

without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other
than

that

of

bringing

Mrs. Hodges

to

justice

and

the

criminal proceedings against Mrs. Hodges were terminated in
her favor.

Additionally, because both defendants refused to

inform the prosecuting attorney until the eve of Mrs. Hodges
criminal

trial

that

there

was

substantial

exculpatory

evidence which they had knowledge of for some time, they are
liable for continuing malicious prosecution.
2*

Gibsons terminated plaintiff on the basis of a

false criminal accusation which it knew to be false.

That

action violated the public policy of the state andf thusf
Gibsons is liable for wrongful termination of the plaintiff.
3.

Both defendants1 actions against Mrs. Hodges in

procuring the initiation of a criminal action against her
were done maliciously, wantonly and with reckless disregard
for the rights of Mrs. Hodges and subjects them to punitive
damages.
4.

Plaintiff was not required to plead the exact

dollar amount of her special and general damages.

Since

plaintiff's complaint placed defendants on notice of the
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type

and

nature

of

the

special

damages

claimed,

the

instructions submitted by the court to the jury concerning
damages were correct.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT BOTH GIBSONS AND CROSGROVE
ARE LIABLE TO MRS. HODGES FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
COMPORTS WITH UTAH LAW AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
Restatement of Tortsf Secondf §653f succinctly sets
out

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action

for

malicious

prosecution:
A private person who initiates or procures
the institution of criminal proceedings
against another who is not guilty of the
offense charged is subject to liability
for malicious prosecution if
(a)
He initiates or procures the
proceedings without probable cause and
primarily for a purpose other than that of
bringing an offender to justice, and
(b) The proceedings have terminated
in favor of the accused.
Cf. Shippers' Best Express, Inc. v. Newson, 579 P.2d 1316
(Utah 1978); Kennedy v. Burbidge, 183 P. 325 (Utah 1918).
At

trial,

plaintiff

proved

by

a

preponderance

of

the

evidence, each and every one of these elements:
Ac

The

criminal

proceedings

were

terminated

in

favor of Mrs. Hodges.
Section 659 of the Restatement states in pertinent
part:
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Criminal proceedings are
in favor of the accused by

terminated

(c)
The formal abandonment of the
proceeding by the public prosecutor. . .
Restatement

of

Tortsf

Second,

§659.

The

authors

also

explained what is "formal abandonment of the proceedings":
The rule stated in this Section is
applicablef howeverf to any method other
than that of the entry of nolle prosequi/
by which a public prosecutor may formally
abandon the prosecution of the proceedings
as, for example, by a motion to dismiss
the complaint.
Id. comment

e

(emphasis

added).

See, also, Gowin v.

Heider, 386 P.2d 1 (Or. 1963).
In this instance, the prosecutor moved to dismiss
the

action

Crosgrove.

as

soon

as

he

learned

(R. 686-87; Ex. 15).

the

truth

That motion was granted

and the criminal proceeding was terminated
Mrs. Hodges.
B.

about Mr.

favorably for

(Ex. 6 ) .
The

defendants

procured

the

initiation

of

criminal proceedings against Mrs. Hodges without probable
cause.
There is no doubt that under Utah law and the facts
of

this

case,

Gibsons

and

Crosgrove

are

liable

for

initiating the criminal proceedings against Shauna Hodges.
The draftors of the Restatement of Torts Second explained
that:

- 1R -

Criminal proceedings are initiated by
making a charge before a public official
or body in such form as to require the
official or body to determine whether
process shall or shall not be issued
against the accused.
Restatement

of Tortsf

Second, §653 comment

c.

CJ[. Id.

comment d.

However, the draftors realized fully that the

police and prosecutors are often misled when an accuser
fails

to

make

authorities.

a
The

full

and

deceptive

fair

disclosure

accuser

is

then

responsible.
Influencing a Public Prosecutor.
A
private person who gives to a public
official information of another's supposed
criminal misconduct, of which the official
is
ignorantf
obviously
causes
the
institution of such subsequent proceedings
as the official may begin on his own
initiative/ but giving the information or
even making an accusation of criminal
misconduct
does
not
constitute
a
procurement of the proceedings initiated
by the officer if it is left entirely to
his discretion to initiate the proceedings
or not.

If, howevery the information is known
by the giver to be false, an intelligent
exercise of the officer's
discretion
becomes impossible, and a prosecution
based upon it is procured by the person
giving the false information. In order to
charge
a
private
person
with
responsibility
for the initiation of
proceedings by a public official, it must
therefore appear that his desire to have
the proceedings initiated, expressed by
direction, request or pressure of any
kind, was a determining factor in the
official's
decision
to
commence
the
- 16 -

to

the
held

prosecution, or that
the
information
furnished by him upon which the official
acted was known to be false.
Id. comment g (emphasis added).
Utah law recognizes that a full and fair disclosure
of the facts made to the prosecuting attorney presents a
good defense to an action for malicious prosecution.

As

noted in the comments to the Restatement, however, it is
necessary that there be a full and fair disclosure of all
material facts.

See, Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System,

Inc. , 11 Utah2d 133, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960); Wendelboe v.
Jacobson, 10 Utah2d 344, 353 P.2d 178, 181 (1960); Cottrell
v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622, 623
(1956); cf. Perkins v. Stephens, 28 Utah2d 436, 503 P.2d
1212 (1972).
Whether

a

defendant

has

made

a

full

and

fair

disclosure is, however, a question of fact properly left to
the jury.

As this Court wrote in Cottrell v. Grand Union

Tea Co.:
The critical point of inquiry is
this:
Considering all of the evidence,
could reasonable minds fairly say that
they were not convinced by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendants made a
full and truthful disclosure of the
material facts to the county attorney?
Id., 299 P.2d at 623.
The evidence produced at trial shows without a doubt
that there was no full and fair disclosure to Detective
- 17 -

Lyday or the prosecuting attorney.
to Detective
prosecutor,

Lyday
subtly,

and

In fact, the story told

subsequently

but

relied

effectively,

upon

removed

by

the

the

prime

suspect from consideration.
Mr. Crosgrove, when he went to the West Valley
Police Department, for obvious self-serving reasons, failed
to tell

the detective that he, for some

time, had been

stealing money and merchandise from the store.
Clearly, this was a material fact.

(R. 862).

Although it was the

assistant manager who serendipitously discovered

that the

receipts from register number four were not on the daily
report, all the Gibsons employees, Mr. Harris, Mr. Cornett,
as well as Mr. Crosgrove, incorrectly
Lyday

informed Detective

that it was Mr. Crosgrove who discovered

money was missing.

(Ex. 3; R.

that the

618-19, 842, 1075-76).-1

Additionally, they told Detective Lyday, falsely, that Mr.
Crosgrove discovered all of the evidence in the security
room wastepaper basket.

(R. 621, 846; Ex. 3). If there had

been a full and fair disclosure of all of the material facts
to Detective Lyday, there would have been a different prime
suspect.

In fact, Mr. Crosgrove made the same misstatement in his sworn
testimony at the probable cause hearing. (R. 842). Furthermore, Gibsons
attempted to tell the same untrue story even after this action was initiated, but
finally admitted to the truth. (R. 605).
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The exact

same

issues were faced by the Oregon

court in Lampos v. Bazar, Inc., 527 P.2d 376 (Or. 1974).
that

case, plaintiff

initiated

an

action

for

In

malicious

prosecution after he had been accused by his employer of
stealing two tires from its store, arrested and charged with
theft.

Defendant alleged, as here, that it could not be

liable for initiating the action because it had made a full
and fair disclosure.
failed

However, the defendant's employees

to tell the grand

jury

that

the plaintiff, when

confronted with the accusation, had produced a copy of a
receipt which he claimed showed that he had purchased the
tires and had made a down payment of $5.

The Oregon court,

relying upon Varner v. Hoffer, 267 Or. 175, 515 P.2d 920
(1973) and Restatement

of Torts Second

§666, comment g,

found that the full and fair disclosure question was to be
left to the jury to decide.

Lampos, 527 P. 2d at 383.

In

that case, the court allowed the jury's finding against the
defendant to stand.

Id.

Additionally, the defendants here failed to make a
full and fair disclosure after the action was initiated.
The jury was instructed in this case as follows:
If you find that the defendants
learned of the facts which tended to
exculpate the plaintiff on the charges and
that the defendants did not inform the
authorities of such exculpatory facts,
then you may consider that as a factor
establishing malicious prosecution.
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Jury Instruction No. 38.

(R. 437).

In Lampos v. Bazar, Inc., the defendant learned of
the exculpatory evidence after they had spoken to the county
attorneyf but prior to the time they testified before the
grand jury.

The court, relying on Restatement of Torts,

Second, §662, comment

f and

§655 noted

that under

such

circumstances, one who later learns of exculpatory facts may
still be liable for malicious prosecution.
at 3 5.

Lampos, 527 P. 2d

See, also, Rogers v. Hill, 576 P.2d 328, 333 (Or.

1978).
In this case, two months prior to the date set for
trial, Gibsons

learned

of

a major

piece

of

exculpatory

evidence.

Mrs. Hodges1 prime accuser was indeed a thief and

stealing

from

Nonetheless,

no

the

West

one

at

Valley

Gibsons

store.

bothered

prosecutor until the very eve of trial.

(R.
to

549).

inform

the

(R6 600-01).

In

short, they withheld this exculpatory evidence allowing the
prosecution to go forward for some time until it reached a
point where they were going to be the subject of ridicule
and public embarrassment.

This fact alone allowed the jury

to find Gibsons liable for continuing malicious prosecution.
There

is an abundance of evidence

demonstrating

that both defendants procured the initiation of the criminal
proceedings

against

Mrs. Hodges

without

Restatement of Torts, Second, §662 states:
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probable

cause.

One who initiates or continues criminal
proceedings against another has probable
cause for doing so if he correctly or
reasonably believes
(a) that the person whom he accuses
has acted or failed to act in a particular
manner; and
(b)
that those acts or omissions
constitute the offense that he charges
against the accused; and
(c) that he is sufficiently informed
as to the law and the facts to justify him
in
initiating
or
continuing
the
prosecution.
For the defendants to have had probable cause, they
must have had both a reasonable belief in the guilt of Mrs.
Hodges, as well as a subjective belief.

See, Gustafson v.

Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 525 P.2d 118, 120 (Or.
1974);

Hryciuk

v.

Robinson, 213 Or. 542, 326 P.2d

424

(1958); cf. Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11
Utah 2d 133, 355 P.2d 714, 717 (1960).
The fact that the circuit court , after a hearing,
found that there was probable cause to detain Mrs. Hodges
and bound her over for trial is not conclusive proof that
there was probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings
against

plaintiff.

In

Olsen

v.

Independent

Order

of

Foresters, 7 Utah2d 322, 324 P.2d 1012 (1958) this Court
found the fact that a magistrate bound over the accused for
trial did not show that there was probable cause to initiate
the proceedings.

In fact, if the probable cause hearing was
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tainted with false testimony, as heref

then the probable

cause hearing has no tendency whatsoever to show that there
was probable cause.

As the court ruled in Gowin v. Heider,

386 P.2d 1 (Or. 1963) .
[I]f [the indictment] was procured by
false testimony of the defendant in an
action for malicious prosecution it has no
tendency whatever to establish probable
cause.
Id. at 9.

Moreover, the fact that the defendants did not

make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts to the
authorities is evidence that the defendants initiated the
proceedings

without

probable

cause.

See,

Id.,

at

9;

Restatement of Tortsf Second, §662(c).
The defendants1 own actions may be used as evidence
to show a lack of probable cause.
The termination of the proceedings in
favor of the accused at the instance of
the private prosecutor who initiated them,
or because of his failure to press the
prosecution, is evidence of a lack of
probable cause.
Restatement of Torts Second, §665(1).
Here, Gibsons own employee, Mr. Birch, acknowledges
that it was he who informed the prosecutor that the charges
would be dropped.
requires

that

in

(R. 644-46, 722-23).
order

to

determine

probable cause:
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The Restatement
the

existence

of

One who initiates or continues criminal
proceedings against another has probable
cause for doing so if he correctly or
reasonably believes

(c) that he is sufficiently informed
as to the law and the facts to justify him
initiating or continuing the prosecution.
Restatement of Tortsf Second, §662.

In Comment j to that

section, the draftors wrote:

In summary, it may be said that the
defendant has probable cause only when a
reasonable man in his position would
believe, and the defendant does in fact
believe,
that
he
has
sufficient
information as to both facts and the
applicable
law
to
justify
him
in
initiating the criminal proceeding without
further investigation or verification.
Similarly, this Court explained in Cottrell v. Grand
Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956):
The
defendant's
agents
were
businessmen, who either were or should
have been, entirely familiar with the
facts and circumstances, and should have
been
acting
with
caution
and
circumspection in regard to a matter so
serious as charging plaintiff with a
felony.
Id. at 626.
In this action, there is an abundance of evidence to
demonstrate

that

there

was

no

probable

defendants to initiate this proceeding.
Crosgrove

clearly

had

exculpatory
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cause

for

the

First, defendant

information

which

he

withheld from the police.

Gibsons eventually informed the

prosecutor that the charges would be dropped.
722-23).

(R. 644-46,

Mr. Crosgrove even told one witness that he did

not believe that Shauna Hodges took the money.

(R. 704-05,

714).
C.

These

defendants

initiated

the

criminal

proceedings for an improper purpose.
Restatement of Torts, Second, §668 states:
To subject a person to liability for
malicious prosecution, the proceedings
must have been initiated primarily for a
purpose other than that of bringing an
offender to justice.
Comment e to that section reads:
The only proper purpose for which
criminal proceedings can be instituted is
that of bringing an offender to justice
and thereby aiding in the enforcement of
the criminal law.
Comment g goes on to explain:
One who initiates the proceedings to force
the accused to pay money or to turn over land or
chattels to the accuser, does not act for a proper
purpose.
This is true although the money is
lawfully owed to the accuser or the thing in
question has been unlawfully withheld or taken
from him, so that relief might have been secured
in the appropriate civil proceedings.
Similarly,

this

Court

has

held

that

initiating

criminal proceedings to force an accused to pay money is
There is no doubt that Crosgrove was acting on behalf of Gibsons when
he told his "story" to Detective Lyday. (R. 596). Therefore, Gibsons is liable for
his actions. See, Coombs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272
(1951).
-24-

improper r even

if the money

is lawfully owed.

Haas v.

Emmett, 28 Utah 2d 138, 459, P.2d 432,433 (1969).
Furthermore,

§669

of

the

Restatement

of Torts,

Second, reads:
Lack of probable cause for the
initiation of criminal proceedings in so
far as it tends to show that the accuser
did not believe in the guilt of the
accused, is evidence that he did not
initiate the proceedings for a proper
purpose.
Here

there was ample

evidence

defendants did not have a proper purpose.

to show

that

the

Mr. Crosgrove did

not reveal all of the true facts to the prosecutor or to the
police.

His purpose was obvious:

from himself.

to district attention

Again, Gibsons is liable for his actions.

Moreover, Gibsons

independent

actions

show

that

they had an ulterior motive other than bringing an offender
to justice.

When they had an admitted thief on their hands,

Crosgrove, they did not bring that offender to justice.
599-601).

But

after

Mrs. Hodges

refused

to

(R.

"buy" her

innocence, and only after she refused, they then went to the
West Valley Police.

(R. 920).

Finally, when Gibsons did

learn of the exculpatory evidence in March, 1982, they did
not turn that over to the police.

Is that a corporation

interested only in justice?3
Defendants also claim that they were prejudiced because certain jury
instructions used the word "guilty" rather than "liable". If anything, this would aid
the defendants since the burden of proof standard in a "criminal action" is much
-25-

II.
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRED THE COURT TO RECOGNIZE
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN THIS CASE
In Utah, generally, an employee is free to quit her
employment at any time and an employer is free to discharge
the employee at any time with or without cause.

See, e.g. ,

Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).

However,

this court has recognized that there are exceptions to the
employment at will doctrine.

In Bihlmaier v. Carson, the

court wrote:
In the absence of some further
express or implied stipulation as to the
duration of the employment or of a good
consideration in addition to the services
contracted to be rendered, the contract is
no more than an indefinite general hiring
which is terminable at the will of either
party.
Id. at 792.

See, also, Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6

Utah2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 211 (1957).

Recently, in Rose v.

Allied Development Co., 34 Utah Adv.Rep. 29 (Utah 1986), the
court reaffirmed that exceptions to the at will doctrine
exist.

In

that

opinion,

the

court

noted

that

"the

employerfs absolute right to discharge employees has been

greater than in a civil action.
See, State v. Starks? 627 P.2d 88 (Utah
1981)(beyond reasonable doubt standard). If the jury's minds were referred to a
"criminal guilt-innocence context", appeal brief at 18; it benefitted the
defendants.
This Court will not reverse a jury verdict if the instructions
constitute harmless error. See, e.g., Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d
448, 491 P.2d 1209 (1971); Universal Investment Co> v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d
336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965). Additionally, the jury was instructed properly on the
burden of proof. (R. 407-09).
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somewhat

limited

by

subsequent

federal

and

legislation" expressing general public policy.

state

jCd. at 30.

In its opinion, the court noted two examples:

the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 14 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) which prohibits
the discharge of employees based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin; and also Utah Code Ann. §34-35-6
(1953) which similarly prohibits the discharge of employees
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or
handicap.

Rose v. Allied Development Co., at 30.

Other courts have recognized on a regular basis
that an employment at will contract may be modified by a
public policy exception when an employee is discharged for
reasons violative of the public policy.
Burroughs

Corp.,

438

F.Supp.

1052

See, e.g., Wehr v.
(E.D.Penn.

1977)

(Pennsylvania's employment at will doctrine recognizes the
public policy exception and allows a cause of action for
wrongful

termination

of

employment

based

on

age on

the

grounds that it violates the public policy of the State of
Pennsylvania).
In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) plaintiff's secretary was forced to
resign after it was discovered that she had had an affair
with plaintiff

who was married and a manager of one of

defendant's divisions.

At that time, plaintiff was allowed

to keep his position.

Shortly after her resignation was
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obtained, she filed a sex discrimination claim against Dun &
Bradstreet.

The defendant requested Brockmeyer to file a

written report about the events which
secretary's
scapegoat

resignation.
for

the

Figuring

allegedly

led to his former

he

would

become

discriminative

a

actions,

plaintiff refused and also told defendant that, if called to
testify, he would tell the truth.
Three days after the defendant settled the claim
with the former secretary, plaintiff Brockmeyer was fired.
At

that

time he was offered

$8,500

if he would

release agreeing not to sue Dun & Bradstreet.

sign a

He refused.

At trial, the jury was instructed that a terminated
employee can recover damages from his or her employer "when
the discharge violated clear and specific public policies or
when the discharge is retaliatory or is motivated by bad
faith or malice."

Id. at 837.

While the court found in

that particular instance that defendants' behavior did not
violate the fundamental public policy as expressed in the
constitution or statutes, the court did recognize that "a
wrongful

discharge

is

actionable

when

the

termination

clearly contravenes the public welfare and gravely violates
paramount requirements of public interest."

^d. at 840.

Other states have recognized the exact same cause
of action, for the same reasons.

In Petermann v. Teamsters

Local 396, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) the court
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recognized that the employee is wrongfully discharged if he
is

fired

because

he

refuses

direction of the employer.

to

commit

perjury

at

the

In Frampton v. Central Indiana

Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) the court held
that the employee is wrongfully discharged when an employer
fires
claim.

the

employee

for

filing

a

workmen's

compensation

In Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)

the court allowed a cause of action for wrongful discharge
as one public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine when

the employee was fired for complying with

statutory jury duty service.
The court wrote:
We
conclude
that
there can be
circumstances
in
which
an
employer
discharges an employee for such a socially
undesirable motive that the employer must
respond in damages for any injury done.
Id. 536 P.2d at 515.
In Palmateer

v. International

111.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d

876

Harvester

Co. , 85

(1981) the court allowed the

cause of action for wrongful discharge when the employer
fired the employee because the employee supplied information
about

another

authorities.

employee

to

the

local

law

enforcement

The court stated:

No
specific
constitutional
or
statutory provision requires a citizen to
take an active part in ferreting out and
prosecution of crime, but public policy
nevertheless
favors
citizen
crime
fighters.
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Id. 421 N.E.2d at 880.
The Oregon court also recognized that a wrongful
discharge action may be brought when an employee is fired
for

filing

a

workman's

compensation

claim.

Brown

Transcon Linesy 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).

v.

And in

Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d
1081 (1984), the Washington Court wrote:
We join the growing majority of
jurisdictions in recognizing the cause of
action in tort for wrongful discharge if
the discharge of the employee contravenes
a clear mandate of public policy.
Id. at 1089.

See, also, Wiskotoni v. Michigan National

Bank-West, 716

F.2d

discharge verdict

378

(6th Cir.

in favor

1983) where

wrongful

of plaintiff was upheld when

plaintiff was fired for appearing, purusant to a subpoena,
and testifying before a grand jury.
In Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 822
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) the court found that an employee's action
for

"wrongful

firing" stated a cause of action when he

alleged that he was terminated solely to deprive him of his
pension benefits.

The court there found that there was a

strong public policy in New York favoring the protection of
integrity in pension plans and that to allow the action of
the employer would be a violation of that public policy.
See,

also, Kovalesky

v. A.M.C. Associated

Merchandising

Corp., 551 F.Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Vigil v. Arzola, 102
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N.M. 682, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. App. 1983).
Article I §7 of the Utah Constitution expressly
declares that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or

property

without

due

process

of

law.11

Similarly,

Article I §12 invests the accused in a criminal action of
certain

rights

which

circumstances.

cannot

be

violated

under

any

Likewise, it is the public policy of this

state, and this nation, that an accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See, e.g. ,

State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978).
Utah statutes similarly recognize that it is the
policy of the state that a person be allowed to exercise his
right to work.

Utah Code Ann. §34-34-2 specifically states,

in part:
The exercise of the right to work
must be protected and maintained free from
undue restraints and coercions.
Cf., Utah Code Ann. §34-24-1 (prohibiting blacklisting).
In this case, the jury was instructed that there
existed

a

very

narrow

and

employment at will doctrine.

specific

exception

to

the

Instruction No. 43 (R. 442)

stated:
Plaintiff was free to quit her
employment with defendant at any time, and
defendant was free to discharge plaintiff
at any time without cause.
However, if
you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff was discharged
on
the basis
of
a
false
criminal
accusation known to defendant Gibsons
- 31 -

Products Co. to be false, then you may
find the defendant Gibsons Products Co.
guilty of wrongful discharge of the
plaintiff.
This instruction requiring that the plaintiff should
not

suffer

in

her

employment

on

the basis

of

a

false

criminal accusation which is known to the employer to be
false

is even narrower

innocence

until

than the public policy presuming

proven

guilty.

To

end

the

person's

employment under these circumstances imposes a penalty for
conduct which is not criminal.
Here,

the

jury

found

that

Gibsons

fired

the

plaintiff on the basis of a false accusation which it knew
to be false.

There was an abundance of evidence to support

this finding.
At
suspended
employment.

the
her,

time
but

of
did

Mrs.
not

Hodges1
discharge

arrest,
her

Gibsons

from

her

However, once the company learned the truth

about the chief witness and accuser of Mrs. Hodges, and once
it learned that at its instigation, the charges would be
dismissed,

Gibsons

immediately

fired

Mrs. Hodges.

The

jury's verdict on this issue must be sustained.
Even if the Court finds there is no cause of action for wrongful
termination under these outrageous facts, it must sustain the general jury verdict
on damages if it upholds the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for malicious
prosecution. See, Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah
1984); Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co v. Isom., 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982).
Even though a "special verdict" form was submitted to the jury, the damage
portion of that verdict form was clearly the equivalent of a general verdict when
they found in favor of plaintiff on more than one cause of action. (R. 464-66).
-32-

Ill
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
This
damages

may

Court
be

has

awarded

consistently
for

conduct

held

that

punitive

is

"willful,

which

malicious or which manifests a reckless indifference toward
and disregard for the rights of others."

Branch v. Western

Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 277-78 (Utah 1982).

See,

also, Atkin v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, 709
P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah
1985); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 702 P.2d 1106
(Utah 1985).
In this case there was an excess of sufficient
evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the
jury.

First, there is no doubt that there was sufficient

evidence to establish that the defendants were liable to the
plaintiff

for

malicious

procuring

and

continuing

prosecution.
the

Their

initiation

of

actions
a

in

criminal

proceeding against Shauna Hodges without probable cause and
for

an

improper

purpose

clearly

demonstrates

malicious

conduct fraught with reckless indifference for the rights of
this plaintiff.

See, above, Argument, Point I.

Defendants did not make a full and fair disclosure
to the police or the prosecuting attorney of all material
See, e.g., Owens v. MeBride, 694 P.2d 590 (Utah 1984). There was no objection to
the verdict form. (R. 1120-28).
-33-

facts they learned in their investigation of the theft which
occurred

at

Crosgrovef
testified

the

West

as manager
falsely

Valley
of

under

store.

Defendant

Chad

the Gibsons West Valley store,
oath

and

Hodges' probable cause hearing.

inaccurately

at

Mrs.

Furthermore, when Gibsons

learned of the clearly and undeniably exculpatory evidence
that the manager, the person with the best access to the
money

on the evening of September

September

4,

1981, had

admitted

3 and
to

the morning of

being

a

thief

and

embezzler, it did not make any attempt whatsoever to inform
the authorities of this fact.

No conduct imaginable could

be more outrageous, malicious, willful or done with greater
reckless indifference to the rights of this plaintiff.
IV
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SPECIAL
AND GENERAL DAMAGES WAS CORRECT
Defendants complain that Jury Instruction No. 11 (R.
410)

and

No.

pleadings.
claiming

46

(R.

445)

did

not

conform

with

the

Defendants attempt to limit plaintiff to $75,000

she asked

actual pleadings.

for only that much. This ignores the
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that:

Plaintiff
has
been
injured
and
suffered
damages
including,
but
not
limited
to, loss of wages, medical
expenses, severe emotional distress and
mental
anguish
requiring
professional
therapy and further pain and suffering at
least in the amount of $75,000, the full
of
extent
of
which
has
not
been
- 34 -

determinedf and which will be established
by proof at time of trial,
(R. 6) (emphasis added).
Similarly,

in her

prayer

for

relief,

plaintiff

prayed for judgment as follows:
1.
In the sum of $75,000 and such
other sums that plaintiff shall establish
by proof at the time of trial.
In Cox v. Johnston, 484 P.2d 116 (Col. App. 1971)
the Colorado Court of Appeals was faced with a very similar
issue.

In that case, the plaintiff alleged the nature of

his special damages, but not the amount.

The defendants

contended, as the defendants do here, that since there was
no amount pled, plaintiff failed to allege special damages
as required by Rule 9(g) of the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The court held that although special damages

must be specifically pled in order to recover, "there is no
requirement
pleaded."
1325

that

the

Id. at 120.

dollar

amount

be

specifically

Cf. Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d

(Utah 1975); Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d

306

(Utah 1975) .
There

is

no

doubt

that

plaintiff

gave

the

defendants actual notice of the special damages she would
claim

at

trial.

Likewise, there

is no doubt

that

the

defendants were apprised of the fact that plaintiff intended
to prove compensatory damages, both general and special in
an amount in excess of $75,000.
- 35 -

Defendants1 argument that

they were deprived of adequate notice is totally without
merit.
Additionallyf

there

is

substantial

prove the amount of damages awarded.

evidence

to

It is important to

note that the special verdict form (R. 464-66) referred only
to compensatory

damages

and

general or special damages.

did

not distinguish

between

Plaintiff testified extensively

to the severe mental distress she endured as a result of the
wrongful

actions

of

the

defendants.

(R.

936-39).

Similarlyf plaintiff's husband testified extensively as to
the effect and mental distress his wife displayed.
1000-05).

(R.

Such mental pain and suffering is entitled to

compensation.

Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325f 1329 (Utah

1975).
Likewise, there is substantial evidence showing the
amount of attorneys fees plaintiff incurred in defending the
criminal action.

(R. 931-35; Exs. 24 & 25). There was also

extensive evidence detailing the plaintiff's therapy bills
which were incurred as a proximate cause of the wrongful
acts

of

the

defendants.

(R.

935-49; Exs.

18

& 26).

Finally, there also was extensive evidence demonstrating the
lost wages suffered by plaintiff.
29).

(R.-949-57; Exs. 28 &

These three items of damages totalled $26,515.

18, 24, 25, 26 & 29).

(Exs.

In short, defendants1 argument that

there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's damage

- 36 -

verdict is frivolous.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the verdict of
the jury be sustained.

This verdict was supported by ample

evidence and the jury's thoughtful deliberations should not
be disturbed.
DATED:

June

/ / .

1986.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys
for
Respondent
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